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Cryptographic protocols such as IKE, SET, TLS, Kerberos have been de-
veloped to secure electronic transactions. However the design of such protocols
often appears to be problematic even assuming that the cryptographic primi-
tives are perfect, i.e. even assuming we cannot decrypt a message without the
right key. An intruder may intercept messages, analyse them, modify them
with low computing power and then carry out malevolent actions. This may
lead to a variety of attacks such as well-known Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
Even in this abstract model, the so-called Dolev-Yao model, protocol anal-
ysis is complex since the set of states to consider is huge or inﬁnite. One should
consider messages of any size, inﬁnite number of sessions. The interleaving of
parallel sessions generates a large search space. Also when we try to slightly
relax the perfect encryption hypothesis by taking into account some algebraic
properties of operators then the task gets even more diﬃcult.
We have developed in Cassis/LORIA team several translation and
constraint solving techniques for automating protocol analysis in Dolev-Yao
model and some moderate extensions of it. Protocol speciﬁcations as they
can be found in white papers are compiled by the CASRUL system [8,2] and
then are passed on decision procedures for checking whether they are exposed
to ﬂaws 1 .
The compiler: The CASRUL compiler performs a static analysis to
check the executability of the protocol (i.e. whether each principal has
enough knowledge to compose the messages he is supposed to send), and
then compiles the protocol and intruder activities into an Intermediate
Format based on ﬁrst-order multiset rewriting. The Intermediate Format
unambiguously deﬁnes an operational semantics for the protocol. Afterwards,
diﬀerent translators can be employed for translating the Intermediate Format
into the input language of diﬀerent analysis tools. The Intermediate Format
can be also generated in a typed mode (the untyped one is the default),
1 This work was partially funded by the Information Society Technologies programme of
the European Commission, Future and Emerging Technologies under the IST-2001-39252
AVISPA project
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which leads to smaller search spaces at the cost of abstracting away type-
ﬂaws (if any) from the protocol. This compiler is the front-end of several
eﬃcient veriﬁcation tools designed in the context of the European projects
AVISS/AVISPA [1]. It is open to connection with other tools. Compared to
CAPSL, a related tool, CASRUL is able to handle protocols where a principal
receives a message {Na}S, denoting a random number Na encrypted by a
symmetric key S, and then later receives the key S and then uses Na in some
message. In our case, the principal will store {Na}S and will decrypt it when
he later receives the key. This might be useful for e-commerce protocols such
as non-repudiation protocols.
The intruder model: Our intruder model follows the Dolev-Yao intruder
[7]. That is, the intruder has complete control over the network and he can
derive new messages from his initial knowledge and the messages received
from honest principals during protocol runs. To derive a new message, the
intruder can compose and decompose, encrypt and decrypt messages, in case
he knows the key. Hence we can represent the intruder by an appropriate
deduction system on message terms as follows:
Decomposition Composition
{a, b}  a, b a, b  {a, b}
K−1, {a}K  a a,K  {a}K
S, {a}S  a a, S  {a}S
The second decomposition rule for instance speciﬁes that a message encrypted
by the public (resp. private) key K can be recovered by the intruder when
he knows the associated private (resp. public key). Whether the intruder
can compose some message m from a given set of messages M can be
checked in polynomial time. This can be explained easily. In a minimal
length derivation of m from M the intruder only composes messages that
are subterms of the goal m or messages that are (composed) keys encrypting
some part of its initial knowledge M . In a similar way the intruder only
decomposes subterms of M . Hence in a minimal derivation of m from M
only subterms of M ∪ {m} are derived. Therefore such a derivation has its
length bounded by the number of subterms in M ∪ {m} say n. Hence by
iterating the intruder deduction rules on M at most n times we are able to
check whetherm can be derived, and this can be organized in polynomial time.
Constraint solving for veriﬁcation. The detection of ﬂaws in a hostile
environment can be reduced to solving symbolic constraints in the message
space. The intruder should send messages that comply with the protocol
speciﬁcation in order to get undetected by honest agents. After the last
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protocol step, the intruder should be able to derive the secret from the
replies sent by the honest agents (and possibly using some initial knowledge).
Whether there exists an attack on a protocol in a given number of sessions is
an NP-complete problem [9]. The interleaving of parallel sessions is a source
of combinatorial explosion in the search procedure. However even with a
single session the selection of messages to be sent by the intruder introduces
enough non-determinism to be a cause for NP-hardness. On the other hand,
we have proved that when the protocol is insecure (i.e. subject to an attack),
then there always exists an attack such that the sum of sizes of the messages
exchanged between agents is linear w.r.t. the protocol size.
Experiments. The CASRUL implementation of symbolic constraints
solving is relatively eﬃcient and has been successful with many se-
curity problems. For a report on experiments see [2]. The CAS-
RUL tool has a web-based graphical user-interface (accessible at:
http://www.loria.fr/equipes/cassis/softwares/casrul/). Among
the 51 protocols in the Clark/Jacob library [6], 46 can be expressed in the
tool speciﬁcation language. Among the 51 protocols 35 are ﬂawed, and
CASRUL can ﬁnd a ﬂaw in 32 of them, including a previously unknown type
ﬂaw in Denning Sacco Protocol. The tool ﬁnds the 32 attacks in less than
one minute (1.4 GHz processor).
Algebraic operators: relaxing perfect cryptography hypothesis. Our
approach allows for a uniform treatment of many extensions of Dolev Yao
intruder. These extensions have been designed to get more realistic models of
cryptographic protocols.
If we want to express that in the protocol model we consider plaintexts and
ciphered texts cannot be distinguished we can introduce the following intruder
deduction rule:
a  {{a}S}S
We can also consider an intruder equipped with the ability to exploit preﬁx
properties of encryption algorithms based on cipher-block-chaining (CBC).
This again can be expressed by introducing a new deduction rule:
{a, b}S  {a}S
We have recently extended the framework and the complexity results to
the case where messages may be constructed using the bitwise XOR operator
(denoted ⊕) and where the Dolev-Yao intruder is extended by the ability
to compose messages with this ⊕ operator (see [5]). This extension is non-
trivial due to the complex interaction of the ⊕ algebraic properties such as
associativity and commutativity and the standard Dolev-Yao intruder rules.
The technical problems raised by the equational laws are somewhat related to
those encountered in semantic uniﬁcation.
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We ﬁnally present in [4] the ﬁrst decision procedure for the formal analy-
sis of protocols in presence of modular exponentiation with products allowed
in exponents. This is particularly interesting for ﬁnding ﬂaws in protocols
based on Diﬃe-Hellman key construction technique. We illustrate in [4] that
the procedure is powerful enough to uncover known attacks on the A-GDH.2
protocol suite.
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